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Abstract
In this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders
competing to ﬁnance an investment project. Contracts are non-exclusive, hence the bor-
rower can accept whatever subset of the offered loans. We use the model to discuss ef-
ﬁciency issues in competitive economies with asymmetric information and non-exclusive
agreements. We characterize the equilibria of this common agency game with moral hazard
and show that they all belong to the constrained Pareto frontier.
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This paper is devoted to the analysis of credit markets where lenders strategically compete over
the contract offers they make to borrowers. The main aim of the work is to examine the welfare
properties of the equilibria of the market interaction. In doing so, we emphasize the role of the
contractual externalities that naturally arise in such a framework. At the stage of contracting
with a lender, the decision of a single borrower will crucially depend on the contract offers she
is simultaneously receiving from all the other lenders.
We set-up a scenario where the offered loan contracts are non-exclusive, i.e. a borrower is al-
lowed to accept more than one contracts at a time. Exclusivity clauses are not explicitly imposed
in several ﬁnancial relationships.1 Many U.S small ﬁrms have access to multiple credit sources
(Petersen and Rajan 1995) and credit card markets are also clearly non-exclusive situations (see
Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), Parlour and Rajan (2001)).
Recently, many important researches developed examples of interactions with non-exclusive
contracting with the aim of clarifying the relationship between incentives and competition: the
main general results and implications are discussed by Segal and Whinston (2003). In our view,
one of the relevant ﬁndings of the literature can be summarized as follows: the contractual
externalities emerging in this type of interactions can be responsible for existence of constrained
inefﬁcient equilibria. In other words, a Social Planner who is subject to incentive constraints
and feasibility can achieve outcomes that Pareto dominate the equilibrium outcomes of players’
interactions.
The present essay proposes an investigation of the welfare properties of the equilibria of a
credit market when considering strategic competition among external ﬁnanciers. Dealing with
lender-borrower relationships affected by asymmetric information problems, the inefﬁciencies
arising from multiple contracting would provide some welfare foundation for policy measures.2
We study a simple, static and partial equilibrium model of the credit market. We analyze credit
relationships by modelling the competition between a ﬁnite number of lenders who offer credit
lines to a single borrower whose decisions cannot be contracted upon. If agency costs are high
enough, competition among ﬁnanciers delivers non-competitive results, in the forms of credit ra-
1For a general discussion see Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000).
2The present work should be regarded as part of a research project on welfare foundations for policy interven-
tion, in particular following the literature on the credit channel of monetary policy, which focuses on how monetary
variables affect the real economy limiting borrowers’ access to credit. A crucial element of this transmission mech-
anism is the inverse relationship between borrowers’ net worth and the external ﬁnance premium. A tighter policy
induces a rise in the external ﬁnance premium through the adverse effect on borrowers balance sheets, that modiﬁes
the amount of collateral available for lenders. A restrictive monetary policy raising open-market interest rates may
therefore cause a reduction in the amount of lending offered by every ﬁnancier. The theoretical contributions to this
approach share the reference to a principal-agent analysis of credit relationships. As a consequence, the analysis of
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy involves only second-best efﬁcient outcomes. Explicitly accounting
for credit market equilibria that fail to be Pareto constrained optima (i.e. equilibria that do not belong to the second
best frontier) constitutes a preliminary step in bringing welfare issues inside the credit view of monetary policy. For
basic reference, see Bisin and Gottardi (1999), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000).
1tioning and of positive extra-proﬁts at equilibrium. In terms of welfare, though all the equilibria
of this common agency game are constrained-efﬁcient.
Constrained inefﬁcient equilibria have recently been shown to arise in insurance scenarios,
the two mains examples are Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004). These
papers differ from ours in several respects. Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) consider a model of
insurance where the agent (the insured) proposes contract to insurance companies sequentially.
Both the timing and the bargaining power are different in our set-up, where the lenders simulta-
neously offer a contract to the agent. Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) allows principals to use menus,
i.e. rather than to make a take-it or leave-it offer, each principal is allowed to make several offers
and the agent is free to choose one of them.3 Moreover, their equilibrium is not symmetric: not
all principals offer the same menu of contracts.
Nevertheless, a crucial difference between our results and theirs comes from the assump-
tions on agent’s preferences, in particular in case of shirking/default. In our model, if the agent
takes low effort, she gets with probability one a payoff which is linear in total investment and
parameterized to the shirking/default parameter. Introducing such a speciﬁcation in Kahn and
Mookherjee (1998) or in Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) models would destroy the constrained inef-
ﬁcient equilibrium. However, compared to Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), we do not know which
would have been the properties of the equilibrium outcome had they consider take-it or leave-it
offers rather than menus, or had they considered symmetric equilibria.
In our model, we show that considering a borrower with linear preferences is a sufﬁcient
condition for every positive proﬁt equilibrium to be constrained Pareto efﬁcient. Importantly,
the same argument applies to the insurance literature. Whenever the assumption of risk-averse
agents is removed, then the positive proﬁts equilibria in Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), Kahn and
Mookherjee (1998) correspond to second-best allocations.
The discussion is organized in the following way: Section 2 introduces the reference frame-
work provided by Parlour and Rajan (2001), which we set-up in a more standard moral hazard
scenario. Then, Section 3 presents the equilibria of this credit market as parameterized by the
relevance of the moral hazard problem. Section 4 characterizes the constrained Pareto frontier
for this game and provides the welfare analysis of the market equilibria. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Credit relationships are represented in a very simple way. The borrower is penniless, though
she has access to the technology for the production of the only existing good. The production
process is subject to random realizations: if the amount I is invested, with probability p the
production successfully yields G(I) > 0, while with probability (1¡ p) the outcome will be 0.
The production function G(I) is assumed to be continuous, increasing and strictly concave in I:
3This changes the space of relevant mechanisms in the contract design problem underlined, in that the set of
equilibria sustained by menus contains the set of equilibria sustained using simple (point) contracts. See Peters
(2003). The two sets of equilibria are not comparable, in general.
2G0(I) > 0;G00(I) < 0;
withpositivethirdderivative, i.e. G000(I)>0. Furthermore, theInadaconditionsholdlimI!0G0(I)=
¥ and limI!¥G0(I) = 0.
There are N ¸ 2 lenders (indexed by i 2 N = f1;2;:::;Ng) who compete over the loan con-
tracts they simultaneously offer to a single borrower.
Havingreceivedallthecontracts’proposals, theborrowerdecideswhichofthemtosign, tak-
ing into account that she can accept any subset of them.4 She must also take a non-contractible
action (effort), that affects the set-up of the production activity and the successful repayment of
the loans obtained. The effort can take only the two values pH and pL, with pH > pL. If the
high effort pH is chosen, production takes place and the borrower gets G(I)¡R with probability
pH and 0 otherwise. If, on the contrary, the low effort pL is taken she earns the private beneﬁt
BI with probability 1 and loans are not repaid. Without loss of generality, we set pL = 0 and
pH = p.
Let us describe the normal form of the game we are considering. Lenders strategically
compete over their contractual offers to the single entrepreneur-borrower. The strategy of lender
i is given by the choice of the contractCi. The contract offer of lender i is deﬁned by a repayment
line Ri and a loan amount Ii, i.e.
Ci = (Ri;Ii) 2Ci µ R2
+:
Given the space of feasible contract offers for each lender i, we deﬁne the aggregate space of
contracts in the loan sector as C = £iCi. The borrower’s strategy is therefore given by the map
sb :C ! f0;1gN fp;0g:









b =f0;1g is the borrower’s decision of rejecting or accepting lender
i’s offer. The choice of the array ab deﬁnes the set of accepted contracts A:
A =
©




that is, borrower’s decisions are identiﬁed by the choice of the effort level and by the deﬁnition
of the relevant set A. Her strategy set will be denoted as Sb, i.e. sb 2Sb.
We now consider payoffs. The borrower’s payoff is deﬁned by:
pb =
½
p[G(I)¡R] if p is chosen;
BI if no effort is taken ;
4This deﬁnes a scenario of delegated common agency (Martimort and Stole 2003)
3where R and I denote the aggregate repayment and investment respectively, i.e.
R = å
i2A
Ri and I = å
i2A
Ii:
Lender i’s payoff is given by: for every i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng
pi =
½
pRi¡(1+r)Ii if the borrower chooses p;
¡(1+r)Ii if the borrower takes no effort;
whenever his contract is accepted and zero otherwise: r 2 R + is the lender’s cost of collect-
ing deposits.5 Observe that lender i’s payoff will not directly depend on lender j’s strategies.
Existence of contractual externalities among lenders is originated by the borrower’s behavior
only: at the stage of contracting with lender i, the action chosen by the borrower depends on the
contractual offer she is receiving from lender j.6 We can therefore model credit market interac-
tions as a sequential game, with a ﬁrst stage where several lenders are playing a simultaneous
move game and a second stage where the borrower decides on acceptance/rejection of each of-
fer and ﬁnally exerts effort. In formal terms, loan relationships are represented by the following
common agency game G:
G = f(pi)i2N;pb;C;Sbg:
3 Credit market equilibria
This section discusses the properties of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game G.
We parallel the discussion given by Parlour and Rajan (2001) on the equilibria of the credit
market with the aim of emphasizing their welfare properties. For this reason, we do not provide
a detailed analysis of the set of equilibrium allocations.7 With the present note, we want to
characterize the constrained efﬁcient Pareto frontier of this economy and show that competition
among lenders sustains here only second-best (constrained) efﬁcient allocations.
We start by introducing the following assumption.
Assumption 1 We consider B < 1.
Observe that given Assumption 1, the choice of low action determines a social loss of BI¡
I(1+r), where I is the aggregate level of investment. Hence there cannot be any equilibrium
in which this low action is implemented. We analyze the cases where p is implemented, i.e. in
5Lenders here do not have inﬁnite endowment. They rely on the deposit market to ﬁnance entrepreneurial activity.
6This is usually referred to as the absence of direct externalities among principals. Most common agency models
have been developed in such a simpliﬁed scenario. Examples of recent researches where direct externalities among
principals are considered include Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Martimort and Stole (2003).
7For the complete characterization, refer to Parlour and Rajan (2001).
4every equilibrium the borrower will be given incentives not to undertake the low action. The


















Observe that if the low action is chosen, then the borrower has always the incentive to accept the
whole array of offered contracts. This greatly simpliﬁes the incentive analysis.
The investment level that maximizes the aggregate surplus S = pb +å
N
i pi deﬁnes the ﬁrst






where I¤ is such that pG0(I¤) = 1+r and that the corresponding surplus is positive.9
If there were no incentive problem (i.e. if the borrower were not taking any hidden action),
then every equilibrium would involve the ﬁrst-best amount of lending I¤. When strategic be-
havior of the borrower is considered under the additional assumption of exclusive contracting,
i.e. when we explicitly consider incentive constraints but we further assume that the borrower
can only accept one contract at a time, then lenders compete à la Bertrand over contracts; at
equilibrium they get zero proﬁts and the borrower appropriates the whole surplus.
If we allow for non-exclusive contracting, then we formally enter into a common agency
set-up. Given the high degree of externalities involved in the analysis, positive proﬁts equilibria
and low levels of aggregate investment are a typical feature in general. In our model, as will
be shown, we can sustain zero-proﬁt equilibria with competition among lenders offering non-
exclusive contracts for some parameter values, which make the moral hazard problem very mild.
Deﬁnition 1 A(purestrategy)equilibriumofthegameGisanarray[
¡





• the borrower is optimally choosing the set of accepted contracts A (i.e. she is choosing
her optimal array ab 2 f0;1gN) and implementing the high level of effort;
• for every lender i = 1;2;:::;N, the pair
¡
˜ Ri; ˜ Ii
¢




































8Notice that this incentive compatibility controls for the incentive on aggregate default, which is the only relevant
case due to the monotonicity assumption on the borrower’s payoff in this case.
9To make the problem meaningful, we assume that such an I¤ 2 R++ exists. That is, we will restrict the analysis







5This inequality is the borrower’s Incentive Compatibility constraint and it is formulated in
terms of aggregate investment and aggregate revenues. The borrower has no endowment, and her
exogenous reservation utility is zero so that her participation decision will be always satisﬁed.
This constraint deﬁnes lender i’s set of feasible contracts under non-exclusivity.
We can characterize equilibrium allocations in terms of the incentive parameter B. More
precisely, we introduce the threshold value Bz, which deﬁnes the lowest level of incentives com-




If B = Bz, then the ﬁrst-best investment I¤ is feasible and the Incentive Compatibility con-
straint is binding. By equation (3), if I¤ is implemented then the borrower gets the entire surplus.
Lenders’ proﬁts are equal to zero in the aggregate and the corresponding aggregate repayment
will be R¤ such that pR¤¡(1+r)I¤ = 0.10
Whenever B>Bz allocations giving zero-proﬁts to lenders can be sustained only with a level
of debt lower than I¤.11 We denote this level of aggregate investment ¯ I(B)<I¤. On the contrary,
if B < Bz it is then possible to achieve I¤ and at the same time to leave some extra-surplus to
lenders.
We denote IB =minf¯ I(B);I¤g the highest level of investment that is at the same time feasible
and such to guarantee to the borrower the full appropriation of the social surplus. Fig.1 identiﬁes
Bz using the total surplus hump-shaped curve, S = pG(I¤)¡(1+r)I¤, and straight lines starting
from the origin with slope equal to B.
If B > Bz then ¯ I(B) is the maximum incentive compatible level of aggregate investment. If
B < Bz, the intersection of the corresponding straight line from the origin with the curve S will
be on the right-hand side of the ﬁrst-best level of investment, that maximizes total surplus, and
hence I¤ will always be feasible. When the incentive to undertake a low action is small enough,
the impact of asymmetric information is reduced and it is possible to show that only a Bertrand
outcomecanbesustainedatequilibrium. Insuchasituationeverylenderi=1;2;:::;N isoffering
the loan amount Ii = I¤, i.e. the ﬁrst best is achieved, and the repayment line Ri = R¤ =
I¤(1+r)
p
that gives him zero extra proﬁts. This is stated in the following:
Proposition 1 Denote Bc :=
pG(I¤)¡I¤(1+r)
2I¤ . Whenever B · Bc, then the only outcome that can
be supported as a (pure strategy) equilibrium of the game G is (R¤;I¤).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
The intuition for the result is the following: consider a scenario where N ¡2 lenders are
not active, while each of the remaining two can offer a contract associated to a debt level of I¤,
given that 2Bc =Bz. If B=Bc, then the borrower is indifferent between accepting any of the two
contracts and accepting both of them and taking a low level of effort. As long as every single
10This of course implies that every lender earns zero proﬁt, given that they are symmetric and limited liability
holds.






Figure 1: Graphical representation of Bz




p ;Ii = I¤
´
, a Bertrand
argument applies: the two-lenders competition determines undercutting to each other’s offers
until the marginal cost of funds meets the marginal revenues.
If the incentive to take the low action falls between Bc and Bz, then zero proﬁts equilibria
may arise only if N is large enough. The intuition is the following: consider a scenario where
B < Bz and N¡1 lenders are offering the contract (Ri;Ii), where Ii = I¤
N¡1 and Ri =
I¤(1+r)
(N¡1)p is the
repayment level that guarantees zero-proﬁts to the i¡th lender when offering the loan amount
I¤
N¡1. Then, the borrower will accept all of them and implement the high level of effort. There
is therefore room for the n-th lender to offer the zero proﬁts contract (R¤
n;In); if this offer is
accepted, then I¤ can in principle be implemented. The closer is B to Bz, the higher the number
of lenders N ¡1 that is necessary to guarantee that the offer of the n-th lender will be feasible.
More formally, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If B 2 (Bc;Bz), then there exists a critical number of lenders NB such that for all
N > NB the aggregate allocation (R¤;I¤) is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. The proof is discussed in the Appendix.
73.1 Equilibria with positive proﬁts
If we consider the case B > Bz, then positive proﬁts equilibria are a general feature of the analy-
sis. These equilibria are such that every lender is active in the market, though the aggregate
investment level turns out to be strictly lower than IB. A form of credit rationing is therefore
implied by competition over ﬁnancial contracts. Whenever B > Bz, we are in the increasing part
of the social surplus function S = pG(I)¡I ¡rI represented in Fig. 1. As a consequence, a
single lender i offering a zero-proﬁt contract can proﬁtably deviate if all the others are playing a
zero-proﬁt strategy: a Bertrand outcome cannot be sustained at equilibrium.
In particular, we are able to show the existence of a (symmetric) positive proﬁt equilibrium
where all lenders are active: each of them offers the same amount of credit ˜ I and ﬁxes the
repayment ˜ R. Existence of this equilibrium is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If B 2 [Bz;Bm), then there is a critical number of lenders NB such that for every
N ¸ NB, there exist a positive proﬁt equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome
¡
N ˜ R;N˜ I
¢
can be


























= BN˜ I; (5)
(N¡1)˜ I > Im: (6)
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
At equilibrium, all the N existing lenders are active and the borrower is indifferent between
accepting N ¡1 or N contracts (Eq. 4) while exerting high effort. This no-side-contracting
condition is crucial to establish existence of equilibria with positive proﬁts in several works on
moral hazard in insurance economies because it prevents additional purchases of insurance.12
Furthermore, when the borrower accepts N contracts, her Incentive Compatibility constraint
will bind (Eq. 5). Finally, the aggregate level of credit issued by N¡1 lenders is strictly greater
than Im that corresponds to the investment chosen by one monopolistic lender (Eq. 6).
Equilibria with positive proﬁt may also emerge when the incentive to take low action is
relatively small. In such a case, the ﬁrst-best level of investment I¤ will be achieved but the
distribution of the total surplus will be rather favorable to the lenders. This equilibria can be
shown to exist for every B 2 (Bc;Bl] where Bl :=
pG(Im)¡Im(1+r)
I¤+Im
and is smaller than Bz.
They are sustained by latent contracts, i.e. contracts which are not bought at equilibrium and are
used to deter entry. Existence of such equilibria is stated in the following:
12see Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998)
8Proposition 4 For every B 2 (Bc;Bl], there exists a pure strategy equilibrium where only one
contract (say, contract i) is bought. The contract guarantees a positive proﬁt to the lender.
Furthermore, there is a second lender (say, lender j) who offers a zero proﬁt contract that is not
accepted.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
The equilibrium of Proposition 4 is sustained by latent contracts, i.e. contracts not traded at
equilibrium and act as a device to deter potential entrants. The analysis of these sort of equilibria
has been introduced in Arnott and Stigliz (1993) and developed by Bisin and Guaitoli (2004).
The main concern of this note is to characterize the welfare properties of credit market
equilibria when multiple lenders compete over loan contracts. The next section will therefore
provide a welfare analysis of the equilibrium outcomes associated to the game G.
4 Welfare analysis
Wewillprovidehereadescriptionoftheeconomy’sfeasibleset, thatisthesetofplayers’payoffs
corresponding to the allocations implementable by a Social Planner. We introduce the notion of
Social Planner and the related concept of constrained efﬁciency in the same way as it is done in
the literature on incentives in competitive markets (see for instance Bisin and Guaitoli (2004)).
The social planner will choose the aggregate investment level I and the aggregate repayment
R to maximize his preferences over the aggregate feasible set that is usually referred to as the
utility possibility set.13
We will henceforth denote pL the payoff earned by lenders in the aggregate credit sector and
pb the corresponding borrower’s payoff. Let us start considering the ﬁrst-best situation, where
the relevant constraints faced by the planner are those imposed by technology and resources




+ : pL+pb · pG(I¤)¡I¤(1+r)
ª
: (7)
The frontier of the set F is referred to as the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier. All the arrays (pL;pb)








L ¸ pL and p0
b > pb or p0
L > pL and p0
b ¸ pb. In our set-up, the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier is
deﬁned by the function p¤
L(p¤
b).
Observe that the payoffs functions pL(R;I) and pb(R;I) evaluated at the high level of effort
are both linear in the aggregate repayment R. As a consequence, the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier
13In particular, given that the N lenders are homogeneous, the social welfare function will be a weighted sum of






Figure 2: The ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier
will be a downward-sloping 45-degree line. By using the variable pR as a transfer, we can draw
the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier as the one depicted in Fig. 2.
Every point on the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier corresponds to the optimal investment level I¤.
In particular, point A identiﬁes a situation where the whole surplus is distributed to the borrower,
p¤
b = pG(I¤)¡(1+r)I¤, so that pR = (1+r)I¤, i.e. p¤
L = 0. On the contrary, if p¤
b = 0 then
from (7) we get pR = pG(I¤), i.e. lenders are receiving everything and the borrower is left at
her reservation utility of zero (point A0).
Let us now deﬁne the second-best allocations, i.e. the set of allocations implementable by a
planner who is facing informational constraints. The constrained utility possibility set is the set




+ : pL · p¤¤
L (p¤¤
b ;B); pb · p¤¤




where for every given p¤¤
b , p¤¤
L (:) is such that:
p¤¤
L (p¤¤





b · pG(I)¡(1+r)I; (9)
p¤¤
b ¸ BI: (10)
10With respect to the ﬁrst-best problem, we have introduced here the Incentive Compatibility
requirement in equation (10). Observe that for a given p¤¤
b , the lender’s maximization problem
is monotone in R, hence equation (9) will bind at the optimum. We can therefore substitute the
















Figure 3: The First and Second-Best Pareto frontiers for B < Bz
Notice that the constrained utility possibility set and the second-best Pareto frontier are para-
meterized by a given incentive structure B. Recall that we deﬁned Bz as the level of the incentive
11parameter such that:
pG(I¤)¡(1+r)I¤ = BzI¤;
implying that pR = (1+r)I¤, i.e. lenders make zero proﬁts. Hence,
8B < Bz pG(I¤)¡(1+r)I¤ < BI¤:
That is equation (12) is slack and the ﬁrst-best is feasible in the second-best problem.






= (pG(I¤)¡(1+r)I¤;0) belongs to the second-best Pareto
frontier (Fig. 3). Hence given B < Bz, there is room to reduce p¤¤
b without making the con-
straint (12) binding. There will therefore be an interval of entrepreneur’s utilities, i.e. p¤¤
b 2







the ﬁrst best one p¤
L(p¤
b) (Fig. 3). By further reducing the entrepreneur’s payoff we get to
p¤¤
b = BI¤ and p¤¤
L = pG(I¤)¡I¤(1+r)¡BI¤. Every further reduction in p¤¤
b will imply a
decrease in the investment level.
If we consider the case B > Bz, equation (12) will always be binding at the optimum level of
investment, henceitisnotpossibletosustaintheﬁrst-bestinvestmentlevelI¤. Asaconsequence,
for every B > Bz the second-best frontier p¤¤
L (p¤¤
b ;B) will always lie below the ﬁrst best one, as












Figure 4: The First and Second-Best Pareto frontiers for B > Bz
12Hence, while for the cases of relatively mild incentive problem the second-best frontier has
a linear part where the ﬁrst-best level of investment is implemented, when the moral hazard
becomes harsher the frontier contracts inwards.
No matter the value of B, the highest possible payoff for the lending sector corresponds to
the monopolistic allocation, when the entrepreneur is squeezed to a payoff of p¤¤
b = BIm and
the lenders appropriate all the rest.14 Whenever p¤¤
b < BIm every reduction in p¤¤
b calls for a
reduction in p¤¤
L . In the limit the only way to set p¤¤
b = 0 is to ﬁx an investment level equal to
zero, so that there will not be anything left for lenders either. We ﬁnally argue that the concavity
of G(I) will induce a concavity in the second-best Pareto frontier (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4).
Lemma 1 Take any B 2 [0;1] then for every p¤¤







curve. In particular, p¤¤
L (p¤¤
b ;B) has a maximum in p¤¤
b = BIm. For every p¤¤







Proof. If (12) is not binding, we are back to the linear part of the frontier, which is trivially




B . Given p¤¤
b and B, then I is uniquely determined. As a consequence, we get:
p¤¤
L (p¤¤












that is a strictly concave function of p¤¤
b . In particular, for B>Bz, the second-best Pareto frontier
is strictly concave.
Deﬁning the constrained Pareto frontier of the economy gives us more intuitions about the
welfare implications of competition over loan contracts. The existence of positive proﬁts equi-
libria and some form of rationing in credit markets where an arbitrarily large number of homo-
geneous lenders is competing, turn out to be the by-product of the competitive process itself
under asymmetric information. In such circumstances, a single planner who faces the same in-
formational constraints as the lenders cannot implement credit markets allocations that Pareto
dominate the equilibrium outcomes of the strategic interactions between N lenders and a single
borrower.
The equilibria with positive proﬁts and latent contracts described in Proposition fall in the
region where the incentive levels B < Bz: there it is always possible to sustain the ﬁrst best
level of investment I¤ together with p¤¤
b > BI¤. Hence, the latent contracts are just a device for
a different sharing of the surplus. The equilibrium level of investment would be the same that
a social planner would choose when solving (11)¡(12) with a slack incentive compatibility
constraint. This equilibrium allocation would correspond to a point on the linear part of the






where it coincides with the ﬁrst best one.
With respect to the efﬁciency properties of the equilibria described in Proposition 3 we state
the following:
14Notice that every monopolistic investment depends on the value of the incentive parameter, hence it should be
written Im(B).
13Proposition 5 Take a B > Bz and consider the positive proﬁts equilibrium deﬁned in Proposi-
tion 3. Then, if we denote as ˜ pb and ˜ pL the payoffs earned by the single borrower and by all the








Proof. We ﬁrst introduce a useful deﬁnition. Assume that the borrower earns ˜ pb in the positive-
proﬁts equilibrium, we denote ˜ pL(˜ pb) the lenders’ payoff induced by ˜ pb at equilibrium.
Let us now take p¤¤
b = ˜ pb and construct the equilibrium relationship ˜ pL(˜ pb). In the positive-
proﬁts equilibrium deﬁned by (4)¡(6) each lender offers the same contract (˜ I; ˜ R) and in the
aggregate the borrower buys all contracts and exerts high effort. The borrower is indifferent
between accepting N or N ¡1 contracts. Let us call IA the amount of credit issued and pRA the
expected revenues of the lenders. Given that the Incentive Compatibility constraint is binding in
this equilibrium, we then have p¤¤









where we denoted IA := N˜ I.
Given the borrower payoff and the number of active lenders N, the aggregate investment level IA
that supports ˜ pb at equilibrium is uniquely determined. In particular, the Incentive Compatibility
constraint of the equilibrium deﬁnes the same level of aggregate investment of the second-best
problem. This investment level IA determines the aggregate surplus of the economy as:
SA = pG(IA)¡(1+r)IA; (14)









Notice that the payoff the credit sector earns is strictly positive:
p¤¤
L (p¤¤
b ) = pRA¡(1+r)IA > 0: (16)







frontier of the constrained utility possibility set F 0(pb;pL).
5 Conclusion
We constructed a common agency framework for the credit market, where under the assumption
of risk neutral preferences for the agent when choosing low action, every positive-proﬁt equilib-
rium turns out to be constrained Pareto efﬁcient. Despite the externalities originated by strategic
competition over ﬁnancial contracts, borrower’s preferences are such that the Incentive Compat-
ibility constraint is always binding. As a consequence, inefﬁcient outcomes cannot be sustained
at equilibrium. Interesting extensions of this framework to discuss the effects of competition
under non-exclusive contracting both at individual and aggregate level would call for enriching
the contractual scheme to make it more sensitive to the incentive problems.
14A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 in the text.
We ﬁrst prove that the ﬁrst best investment level I¤ is an equilibrium outcome whenever B · Bc.
We consider the following array of offered contracts:
©
(Ri;Ii) = (Rj;Ij) = (R¤;I¤) for i 6= j; (Rk;Ik) = (0;0) 8 k 6= i; j
ª
: (17)
Thatis, therearetwolenders, saylenderiandlender j whooffertheﬁrstbestallocation, whileall
other lenders are offering the null contract (0;0). The borrower is indifferent between accepting
the i¡th and the j¡th contract; given that B · Bc, accepting all contracts and choosing low
action is never a best reply.
In such a scenario, no lender has a proﬁtable deviation given that the ﬁrst best outcome is imple-
mented and the borrower’s proﬁt is maximized.
Now, letusshowthatR¤;I¤ isalsotheuniqueequilibriumoutcome. Inotherwords, weshowthat
no positive proﬁt equilibrium can exist for B·Bc. Observe that every positive proﬁt equilibrium
must imply a binding Incentive Compatibility constraint, otherwise some lender whose contract






















If the total amount of offered loan is lower than I¤, then a single lender, say lender i, can prof-
itably offer a debt level Ii=I¤. Recalling that whenever B · Bc we have p[G(I¤)¡I¤(1+r)] ¸
BI¤, then there is room for the i¡th lender to offer the loan amount I¤ together with a positive
repayment Ri. This behavior constitutes a proﬁtable deviation for the lender, since he is able to




In this case there will be for sure lenders whose contracts are not bought at equilibrium. To show
that no positive proﬁt equilibria can be sustained in this case we ﬁrst assume that åi2A Ii < I¤.
In such a case, let us consider any lender i whose contract (Ii;Ri) is not accepted. By offering
the loan amount I0
i 2 (0;Ii) he can make the borrower’s payoff from accepting all contracts and
playing low action strictly lower; then, there exist a repayment R0
i such to give incentives to
lender i to proﬁtably deviate and to the borrower to accept the contract (R0
i;I0
i) on top of those
contained in the setA. Analogously, if åi2A Ii =I¤, then it is possible to show that every lenderi,
with i2A, can proﬁtably reduce the amount of loan he is offering without inducing the borrower
to modify the optimal choice of A.
Proof of Proposition 2 in the text.
15Consider the case of B 2 (Bc;Bz) and a given number of lenders N. If every lender offers





, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to accept N ¡1
contracts and exert high effort (p). We want to show that these prescriptions (strategies) for each
lender and for the borrower constitute an equilibrium of the game G.
Notice that in the case we described, the borrower obtains the ﬁrst best aggregate level of in-
vestment buying N¡1 contracts, attaining her maximum expected payoff and each single lender
gets zero proﬁts. Let us evaluate if there exist proﬁtable deviations.
Given what her opponents offer, lender i can never propose a loan that the borrower will accept
and guarantees herself positive proﬁts. When all j 6= i lenders offer (R0;I0), whatever lender i
proposes, the borrower can always buy the remaining N¡1 contracts and achieve her maximum
payoff. Hence, it is a best response for lender i to offer (R0;I0) when all other lenders offer
(R0;I0).















that is, we want that the utility she gets from buying all N contracts and exerting low action be















. As N increases, BN ! Bz. Hence for every B 2 (Bc;Bz) there
exists a NB such that for every N > NB, B · BN and the borrower has no incentive to deviate
from buying N ¡1 contracts and choosing p. There does not exist any contract for any lender
i that gives her positive proﬁts and is accepted by the borrower. Hence, (R0;I0) for each lender
and the borrower accepting N¡1 contracts and exerting high effort constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3 in the text.
The proof is organized in two steps. First, we show that there is an aggregate contract
¡
N ˜ R;N˜ I
¢
which is a solution of the system (4)-(5) and satisﬁes (6). In a next step we show that the
strategy proﬁle (Ri;Ii)=
¡
˜ R; ˜ I
¢
for every lender i = 1;2;:::N together with the borrower decision
of accepting all contracts and choosing the high level effort is a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game G.


















¡B˜ I = 0: (22)










Observe that we are considering aggregate investment level that should belong to the interval
[IB;Im], given the system (4)-(6). Now, we also denote Io
B = IB
























so that f (Io
B) < 0.
Using a similar argument, and recalling the deﬁnition of Bm we can check that for every B < Bm












= 0; given ˜ I, the value of R satisfying (4)-(5) can be deﬁned in a direct way.
Now, we have to show that at equilibrium every lender will offer the contract
¡
˜ R; ˜ I
¢
and that the
borrower will always have an incentive to accept all contracts and to implement the high action.
Let us start with the borrower’s behavior if each lender is playing ( ˜ R; ˜ I), then the borrower’s
strategy of accepting N contracts and playing H is a best reply. Equations (4) and (5) guarantee
that when
¡
N ˜ R;N˜ I
¢
is offered in the aggregate then the borrower cannot deviate by accepting
N ¡1 contracts and playing L anyway: this means that she is not in the decreasing part of her
payoff function, so that no deviation involving reductions in the number of accepted contracts
will be proﬁtable. In particular, accepting N contracts will be a best reply.
Let us consider now the behavior of the N lenders. Suppose all (N ¡1) lenders except lender i
offer
¡
˜ R; ˜ I
¢
and consider lender i’s best response. Assume lender i offers (Ri;Ii), his payoff can
be measured with respect to the aggregate amount of loans the borrower takes up:
pi = pRi¡(1+r)Ii
= pG(k˜ I+Ii)¡ pk ˜ R+(1+r)k˜ I
¡(1+r)Ii¡max
©




17where pi is lender i’s payoff as a function of (Ri;Ii) and k = f0;1;2;:::;N ¡1g is the number
of contracts the entrepreneur buys together with the i-th. On the right hand side of the equa-
tion we represented the surplus at the aggregate amount of investment k˜ I +Ii net of the reim-
bursements of the k lenders offering
¡
˜ R; ˜ I
¢










accepting all the contracts offered and choosing low action.
There can be two cases: either Ii · ˜ I or Ii > ˜ I. Let us consider ﬁrst the case when Ii · ˜ I. From
the deﬁnition of the equilibrium, it is clear that the borrower will always prefer to accept at least
(N ¡1) contracts and exert effort p. In this case, the individual revenue of each of the (N ¡1)
lenders obtained by using (4) and (5) will be:











In addition, given Ii · ˜ I and the concavity of G(:) the entrepreneur will buy all the (N ¡1)










which is maximized setting Ii = ˜ I and guarantees a payoff of p ˜ R¡(1+r)˜ I.





¡ pkR+(1+r)k˜ I¡B(N¡1)˜ I¡BIi¡(1+r)Ii (29)
which is increasing in k and takes into account that the contract offered by the lender i could
affect the number of contracts the borrower would accept together with exerting high effort.




¡(1+r)¡B = 0 (30)
which implies k˜ I+Ii = Im.
Hence, Ii = Im ¡k˜ I and (N ¡1)˜ I > Im imply that the highest number of contracts which can
be accepted together with the i-th is k = N ¡2. Hence, the optimal value of k is such that:
k = maxk02f1;2;:::;N¡2gfk0¯
¯Im¡k˜ I > 0g: it follows Ii cannot be greater than ˜ I, which contradicts
the initial assumption.
Therefore, the optimal choice of lender i can only be Ii · ˜ I which implies that his best response
will be to offer a contract
¡
˜ R; ˜ I
¢
.
Hence, the speciﬁc contracts
¡
˜ R; ˜ I
¢
exist and they are robust to individually proﬁtable deviations
when the number of lenders is sufﬁciently high and B 2 [Bz;Bm).
Proof of Proposition 4 in the text.
Given the deﬁnition of Im and I¤ and the continuity of G(:) there exists a Bl such that:
18pG(Im)¡Im(1+r) = Bl(Im+I¤): (31)
Now, for every B 2 (Bc;Bl] we consider the function x(I) = pG(I)¡I(1+r)¡B(I+I¤); by
continuity there exists an investment level I0 such that x(I0) = 0.
The equilibrium is deﬁned by one lender, say lender i, making positive proﬁts offering the in-
vestment Ii = I¤ and the repayment Ri s.t. pRi = pG(I¤)¡I¤(1+r)¡(pG(I0)¡I0(1+r)). A
second lender, say lender j offers the zero-proﬁt contract with Ij = I0 and pR0
j = (1+r)I0. All
other lenders k 6= i; j are offering the null contracts (0;0). The borrower is accepting contract i,
only.
Given the behavior of the other players, lender i must offer the borrower at least a payoff of
pG(I0)¡I0(1+r) in order for his contract to be bought. Hence, he has the incentive to set the
investment level at I¤ so to realize the maximum amount of proﬁts pRi.
Let us now consider lender j: he cannot proﬁtably deviate from the level of investment Ij = I0
and be guaranteed that his offer is accepted, without inducing the borrower to select low action.
Given the existence of the latent contract j, no contract offering positive investment level pro-
posed by any of the inactive lenders will be accepted at equilibrium.
Finally, the borrower is indifferent between accepting either contract i or j in isolation and
choosing high effort, and buying both contracts and choosing low action. That is, accepting i
only is a best reply.
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